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REPLY TO LOWENFELS*
Norman S. Posert
Mr. Lowenfels makes serious charges against the nation's two
leading stock exchanges and the only national securities association. He claims that the procedures they employ in fulfilling their
self-regulatory obligations are deficient and unfair, and he implies
strongly that the members and employees of these organizations
allow personal, rather than professional, considerations to guide
them in the discharge of their duties. If these charges were true,
it would be a serious situation indeed. Fortunately, they are not.
Before dealing with the specifics of the Article, it is necessary
to understand the regulatory scheme in which the self-regulatory
organizations (SROs) play an important role. In enacting the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act),' Congress declared
that transactions in securities in organized markets are "affected
with a national public interest which makes it necessary to provide
for regulation and control of such transactions." 2 The SEC was
established to administer the Act' and given direct regulatory
power in a number of areas, 4 but a major portion of the day-today regulation of the markets was left to the SROs 5 to perform,

subject to SEC oversight.6
* Editor'sNote: The Review invited the American Stock Exchange, the New York Stock
Exchange, and the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) to respond to
the preceding Article. Mr. Norman S. Poser submitted this reply. Mr. Frank J. Wilson,
Vice-President and General Counsel of the NASD, submitted a manuscript providing some
of the authority cited in the footnotes of this reply.
t Executive Vice President, Legal and Regulatory Affairs, American Stock Exchange;
Adjunct Professor of Law, New York University. A.B. 1948, LL.B. 1958, Harvard University.
Ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1976)).
2 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1976).
3 Id. § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 78d.
4 See, e.g., id. §§ 8-11, 21, 23, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78h-78k, 78u, 78w.
5 See, e.g., id. §§ 6, 15A, 15 U.S.C. § 78f (national securities exchanges), 78o-3 (national
securities associations).
6 The exchanges and the NASD are not historically analogous. The 1975 Amendments to the Exchange Act (Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, secs.
4, 12, 16, §§ 6(b)(7), 15A(b)(8), 19(d), (e), 89 Stat. 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(7)
(exchange proceedings), 78o-3(b)(8) (association proceedings), 78s(d), (e) (SEC oversight of
SROs) (1976))) subject exchange enforcement proceedings to the same statutory requirements and SEC review power as has applied to the NASD since its incorporation in 1939
(see Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, sec. 1, § 15A(h), 52 Stat. 1070 (codified at 15 U.S.C.
§78o-3(h) (1976) (as amended)); NASD MANUAL (CCH)
101 (1977)). See note 21 infra.
Thus, NASD proceedings have a longer history of SEC oversight.

402

1979]

REPLY TO LOWENFELS

403

The Act required the SROs to have rules for the disciplining
of members for conduct inconsistent with "just and equitable
principles of trade," 7 a phrase that includes but is not limited to
violations of the Exchange Act and SEC rules.8 The courts soon
held that the duty to have disciplinary rules carried with it an
implied duty to enforce them. 9
Two assumptions underlay the decision of Congress to rely to
a large degree on industry self-regulation, rather than exclusively
on direct government regulation, to carry out the purposes of the
Act. First, the expertise of participants in the securities industry
would make possible a more speedy and responsive regulatory
process than could be expected from a more remote government
agency. 10 Second, the SROs could enforce compliance with "ethical standards beyond those any law can establish,""11 as well as

' Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6(b)(5), 15A(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78(b)(5), 78o3(b)(6) (1976).
s See, e.g., id.§§ 6(d)(1)(B), 15A(h)(1)(B), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(d)(1)(B), 78o-3(h)(1)(B).
9 Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 244 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
10

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMM'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MAR-

H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 693-94 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
SPECIAL STUDY]. The Report of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, discussing the proposed 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, stated:
These bodies do not act just like Government agencies, whose procedures and
functions are derived from, and often prescribed by, statutes rather than from
the decisions of those who choose to become members, and the Committee
believes the distinction is essential to the concept of self-regulation. This does
not mean that the decision-making processes of the self-regulatory bodies cannot be improved. Quite to the contrary, but in the Committee's view it would be
self-defeating to saddle the self-regulatory organizations with the wholly [sic]
panoply of Governmental administrative procedure.
One of the advantages of self-regulation is the flexibility and informality of
its decision-making procedures. Further, self-regulatory organizations differ as
to their membership, regulatory responsibilities, and economic power. It would
be difficult to prescribe a single "proper" decision-making procedure appropriate to the circumstances of every self-regulatory organization, and it is
doubtful that any such formal procedure would better serve the goal of effective securities regulation than the present practice of encouraging each organization to develop procedures which best serve its needs and those of public
investors.
S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 28-29 (1975).
The SEC itself has recognized the purposeful informality of NASD proceedings:
"When Congress provided for self-regulatory associations of securities dealers such as the
NASD, it clearly did not intend to create formalistic tribunals akin to courts or even to this
Commission. Self-regulation or cooperative regulation necessarily calls for informality."
Sumner B. Cotzin, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10850 (June 12, 1974), 4 SEC
DocKET 420, 422 (1974).
'" SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 10, at 694 (quoting address given by Justice William O.
Douglas when Chairman of SEC).
KETs,
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with "legal standards in a complex and changing industry." 12
From the viewpoint of SRO members, effective self-regulation is
important not only because they and their customers may be victims of misconduct, but also because the confidence of investors is
essential to preserving healthy securities markets. 13
Over the years, procedures have evolved at the SROs for fulfilling the statutory duty to discipline members in appropriate cases.
Originally, the industry members themselves handled most or all
phases of disciplinary actions in an informal way. A member or a
member's employee suspected of misconduct would be brought
swiftly before a committee of members and given an opportunity
to make his defense. Representation by counsel was not permitted
at any stage of the proceeding, 14 and little, if anything, would be
put in writing. The committee hearing the case would come
quickly to a decision and notify the accused of it. At the exchanges, unlike the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(NASD), there was no appeal to the Securities and Exchange
Commission. 1 5 The premise that these were not judicial proceedings but simply peer review according to trade standards justified
the informality with which they were conducted.
As the securities industry has grown more complex, disciplinary procedures have evolved along more formal and "legalistic"
lines, and functions previously performed by members have increasingly been taken over by the staffs of the SROs. Nevertheless, SRO proceedings remain different from those of courts and
governmental agencies such as the SEC. In the first place, SRO
disciplinary proceedings are based on a contractual arrangement
between the member and the SRO, not on the sovereign power of
the government. Every exchange or NASD member, at the time
he joins, agrees to be bound by the SRO's rules and procedures,
12Id. at 693 (quoting Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion in Silver v. New York Stock
Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 371 (1963)); see Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 514 (1934).
13 In 1941, the public governors of the Amex advocated public disclosure of disciplinary hearings and stated: "A National Securities Exchange has a definite public service to
perform. That service is to maintain a free market for the sale and purchase of securities.
If this service functions properly, business enterprise will be aided by the flow of capital
into industry." SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 10, at 541-42.
24 In 1972, the American Stock Exchange Constitution was amended to expressly permit the assistance of counsel. AM. STOCK Ex. CONsT. art. V, § 1(a), 2 AM. STOCK EX. GUIDE
(CCH) 2153 (1978). Presently, the New Yb'rk Stock Exchange and the National Association
of Securities Dealers allow counsel. See NYSE CONST. art. XIV, § 23, 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH)
1103 (1978); NASD BY-LAws art. VII, § 4, NASD MANUAL (CCH) 1504 (1973).

15 SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 10, at 664-65, 704.
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which must be approved by the SEC. 16 Second, the advantages
of the self-regulatory system-expertise, speed, and the enforcement of ethical as well as legal standards-are as vital today as
they were in 1934. If SRO disciplinary proceedings were to become merely a copy of those of the SEC, an important justification for having a system of self-regulation would disappear.
This is not to say that fundamental concepts of fairness
should not be adhered to in SRO disciplinary proceedings. For
the most part-Lowenfels' unsubstantiated charges to the
contrary-these proceedings are fair. They are conducted within
the framework of the Exchange Act, 1 7 as amended in 1975 18 to
add new procedural protections and to formalize others that had
previously been introduced by the SROs themselves.
In any disciplinary proceeding, the Exchange Act requires the
SRO to bring specific written charges, give proper notice of the
charges to the member, give him an opportunity to defend himself, and keep a record of the proceedings. 19 In addition, any
determination to impose a disciplinary sanction must be accompanied by a statement specifying the objectionable act or practice,
the specific provisions or rules violated, the sanctions imposed,
and the reasons therefor. 20 Furthermore, the respondent may
appeal the SRO's decision to the SEC 2 1 and ultimately to the
16 NYSE CONST. art. IX, § 8, 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 1076 (1978); Am. STOCK Ex."

CONST. art IV, § l(a)(3), 2 Am. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 2134-35 (1978); NASD BY-LAws
art. I, § 4(a)(1), NASD MANUAL (CCH)
1104 (1974).
'7 The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6(b)(7), 15A(b)(8), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b)(7),
78o-3(b)(8) (1976), requires the SRO rules to
provide a fair procedure for the disciplining of members and persons associated with members, the denial of membership to any person seeking membership therein, the barring of any person from becoming associated with a
member thereof, and the prohibition or limitation by the [SRO] of any person
with respect to access to services offered by the [SRO] or a member thereof.
18 See Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, secs. 4, 12, §§ 6(d)(1)(3), 15A(h)(1)-(3), 89 Stat. 97 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(d)(1)-(3), 78o-3(h)(1)-(3) (1976)).
19 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6(d)(1), l'5A(h)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(d)(1), 78o3(h)(1) (1976).
20 Id.
21 Id. § 19(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(d). Section 19 of the Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78s
(1976)) sets forth the oversight responsibilities of the SEC with respect to SROs. It requires
that all rules, policies, practices and interpretations must be filed with the SEC for approval. Under these provisions, the SEC may abrogate, add to, or delete such rules as it
deems necessary to insure the fair administration of the organization consistent with the
requirements of the Act. Section 19 requires that every SRO comply with the provisions of
the Act and its own rules and, absent reasonable excuse or justification, enforce compliance
by its members and their associates with such provisions. The SEC is authorized to suspend
or revoke the registration of an SRO, or to censure or impose limitations upon its activities,
functions and operations upon finding that the SRO has violated, or is unable to comply
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Within this statutory framework, the American Stock Exchange (Amex) has established detailed procedures for the conduct of disciplinary proceedings. Although this Reply focuses on
Amex procedures, the New York Stock Excharige and the NASD
have analogues for many of these procedures.
A person under investigation has the right to be represented
by counsel at every stage of an Amex investigation and disciplinary proceeding. 23 At the conclusion of an interview conducted
on the record, the interviewee is afforded an opportunity to make
a statement regarding the matter at hand. Before any charges are
served, he is given an opportunity to review the transcript of his
testimony and to amend, clarify, or supplement his statement.
Any charges must be specified "in reasonable detail," 2 4 and in
most instances relevant schedules and tables are annexed to the
charges.
Disciplinary cases are heard by panels of Amex members consisting of a panel chairman appointed by the Amex Chairman
with the approval of the Board of Governors, and two to four
additional members selected by the panel chairman from a roster
of approximately forty persons appointed annually by the Amex
Chairman with the approval of the Board. 25 The Amex's compliance staff has no role in the 'selection of these panels or in the
scheduling of hearings. In the course of time, a panel member
may sit on several disciplinary panels, and may encounter issues
similar to those he has decided on previous occasions. This is no
more objectionable than when a judge decides cases with similar
issues during the course of his career; in fact, it may be beneficial
because it provides panel members with expertise on the matters
under consideration.

with, its rules or any provisions of the Act, or if the SRO has failed to enforce compliance
by any member or person associated with a member. The SEC is also authorized to remove
from office or censure any officer or director of an SRO.
22 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 25, 15 U.S.C. § 78y (1976).
23 See note 14 supra. As Lowenfels notes, SRO rules provide sanctions for a member's
refusal to supply information requested in the course of an investigation, and do not recognize an exception where the information might incriminate the member. This procedure
does not infringe on members' fifth amendment rights. See United States v. Solomon, 509
F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975). Moreover, each member agrees to be bound by these rules when
he joins the SRO. See note 16 supra.
24 Am. STOCK Ex. CONST. art. V, § 1(b)(4), 2 Am. STOCK EX. GUIDE (CCH) 2154 (1978).
21 Id. § 1(b)(1), 2 Am. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 2153; RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLICABLE
TO EXCHANGE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS

(1975).

1-3, 2 AM.

STOCK Ex. GUIDE

(CCH) 3403-04
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The scheduling and administration of disciplinary hearings
are handled by a panel assistant who is an attorney in the Amex's
Legal Department and has no connection with the compliance
staff.2 6

This panel assistant attends hearings and advises the

panel chairman on such matters as procedure and the interpretation of rules. On all such matters the final arbiter is the panel
chairman.

27

At the disciplinary hearing, the respondent or his counsel has
an opportunity to make opening and closing statements, to introduce witnesses, and to cross-examine the prosecution's witnessAdherence to the rules of evidence is not required. 2 9

es. 28

In

this regard, Amex rules provide:
The parties ...

may offer such evidence and may conduct

such examination of witnesses as may be deemed relevant to
the issues raised by the charge or charges and by the answer, if
any. The chairman of the Panel shall rule on all questions of
admissibility, relevancy and materiality of evidence offered. 30
Once a decision is reached, a written opinion is prepared by
the panel assistant at the panel's direction, circulated among the
panel members and, after whatever changes they deem necessary
have been made, signed by the panel chairman. The respondent
may appeal a panel decision to the Board of Governors or its
Executive Committee, but the Amex compliance staff has no such
right of appeal. 3 1 If the respondent does not appeal, the Board
of Governors may, on the initiative of at, least four governors, call
up a case for review, but the Amex Board has no power to increase the penalty. 3 2 If the Board believes that the panel has
been too lenient, its only recourse is to remand the case to the
panel with a recommendation that appropriate changes be made.
Against this background I will respond to Lowenfels' charges
as they relate to Amex rules and practices. It is my belief that
26 RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLICABLE TO EXCHANGE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 6, 2 Am.
STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 3406 (1975).
27 Id., rules 4 & 7, 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 3404-05, 3406.
28 AM. STOCK Ex. CONST. art. V, § 1(b)(4), 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 2154 (1978).

Neither the Amex Constitution nor the Disciplinary Rules expressly authorizes opening
and closing statements.
29 RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLICABLE TO EXCHANGE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 7, 2 Am.
STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 3406 (1975).
30 Id.
31 See AM. STOCK Ex. CONST. art V, § 1(b)(5), 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 2155-56

(1978).
32 Id.
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most of my comments apply as well to the New York Stock Exchange and the NASD. Space does not permit me to answer every
inaccuracy and innuendo, but it is possible to'identify and respond to the chief problems of the Article.
There are three kinds of problems. First, the Article contains
a large number of unsubstantiated (and untrue) statements and
suggestions. Second, it charges the SROs with supposed deficiencies, which are in fact phenomena common to judicial proceedings
and administrative proceedings brought by governmental agencies. Finally, Lowenfels criticizes SRO rules, or the absence of
rules, but often ignores the actual practices of the SROs.
A. UnsubstantiatedAllegations
Lowenfels asserts that the compliance staffs of the SROs conduct investigations because of "excessive zeal, narrow perspective,
sheer momentum, inertia, or even personal animosity." 33 Since
the Amex Compliance Department normally carries a case load of
seventy to eighty cases divided among five attorneys, it seems unlikely that they can afford the luxury of conducting investigations
for personal reasons. Lowenfels goes on to suggest that personnel
on all levels of the SRO compliance staffs may occasionally share
responsibility for members' transgressions, ranging from an innocent failure to discover violations early enough 34 to "actual complicity in misdeeds."13 5 If a regulator is involved in misconduct, he
should of course not participate in the investigation and should be
punished himself, but Lowenfels cites no instance of such "complicity."
Lowenfels speculates that the prosecutor may take advantage
of "[o]ld prejudices and rivalries" and "[elxisting competitive considerations" in the respondent's relationship to the industry members that make up the disciplinary panel. 3 6 He adds that the
prosecutor will often socialize with panel members in the airplane
en route to the hearing, at their hotel, and during adjournments.
This situation, he submits, creates "a significant and gratuitous
risk of impermissible influence upon the judgment of the
panel." 3 7 Lowenfels offers no support for these assertions. In any
33 P. 377, supra.

11 Although a regulator may be criticized for failing to discover a misdeed sufficiently
early, it is not altogether clear why this would make him responsible for the misdeed.
35 P. 377, supra.
36 p. 383, supra.
37 P. 389, supra.
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case, panel members are more likely to sympathize with the respondent, with whom they may share common business experi38
ences and problems.
The role of the panel assistant also comes under attack, referred to by Lowenfels as "supposedly impartial" and as a
"facade." 3 9 He states that the panel assistant works closely with
the prosecutor and that his job is to move cases as fast as possible.
In fact, the panel assistant acts independently of the compliance
staff,40 and speed in bringing cases to a conclusion is only one of
several purposes which he must keep in mind. The overall fairness of the proceedings is an even more important goal. Furthermore, it should be recognized that scheduling of disciplinary hearings is a difficult problem, particularly since these hearings are
normally held after business hourg in order to avoid interfering
with the normal business activities of the respondents and the
panel members.
These and other allegations of improper motives on the part
of investigators, panel members, panel assistants, and prosecutors
are not only unsupported but insulting to all concerned. Lowenfels should either substantiate or withdraw his McCarthyesque
charges.
B. Alleged SRO Deficiencies Common to Other Enforcement Proceedings
Lowenfels identifies, as examples of unfairness, phenomena
common to judicial and administrative proceedings. Although
pervasiveness does not prove fairness, it indicates that the practices have sufficient merit to survive years of scrutiny in other
areas of law.
A number of Lowenfels' criticisms, particularly those concerning the role of the panel assistant, follow from the juxtaposition of

"

The SEC has consistently stated that the manner in which the NASD staff interacts
with the District Committee is consistent with the dictates of the Act. See, e.g., First
Philadelphia Corp., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14432 (Feb. 2, 1978), 14 SEC
DoCKEr 71, 73 n.10 (1978). In Sumner B. Cotzin, Securities Exchange Act Release No.
10850 (June 12, 1974), 4 SEC DOCKET 420 (1974), the SEC stated: "we nevertheless remain
unpersuaded that a rigid separation between investigative and adjudicative personnel, such
as that mandated by the APA, is an essential element of fairness in NASD proceedings at
the district business conduct committee level." Id. at 423. The Commission went on to
acknowledge that the NASD's procedures should be reexamined to avoid even the appearance of undue staff influence, but in no case has the Commission found undue influence.
39 P. 386-87, supra.
40 See RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLICABLE TO EXCHANGE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 6, 2
AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 3406 (1975).

410
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the prosecutorial and judicial functions within the same organization. This is equally true in an administrative agency such as the
SEC. In both cases, respondents can be protected against prejudice by ensuring the separation of the two functions. 41 This is
accomplished at the Amex by making the panel assistant responsible to the head of the Legal Department and not the head of the
42
Compliance Department.
Lowenfels directs other criticisms toward the issuance, timing,
and content of formal charges. First, he complains that the decision to bring charges is a unilateral one made by the prosecutor.
But at the Amex, all charges are reviewed by a senior officer of
the Exchange, and the more serious charges receive close scrutiny
by more than one senior officer. 4 3 Lowenfels proposes a procedure like that of a grand jury Ito determine whether there is probable cause to bring charges. Although arguments exist on both
sides of this issue, such a prehearing proceeding would necessarily
counteract one of the particular advantages of the self-regulatory
process-speed. Second, Lowenfels notes that, by the time he
brings formal charges, the prosecutor will have substantially prepared his case. This prosecutorial "head-start" inheres in all regulatory and criminal processes in which the prosecutor initiates
the investigation of possible misconduct. Yet nothing prevents the
respondent from beginning to prepare his defense as soon as he
learns that he is under investigation. In fact, a prudent lawyer
would counsel him to do so. Third, the prosecutor has discretion
as to the order in which he brings cases pending against the same
or different respondents. Lowenfels contends that prosecutors
schedule related cases (involving the same respondent or similar
issues) in order to gain unfair advantages over respondents in a
given case. I know of no examples of this practice at the Amex,

" The issue of separation of functions was considered by the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure, which stated in its Final Report that "[t]hese
types of commingling of functions of investigation or advocacy with the function of deciding are thus plainly undesirable. But they are also avoidable and should be avoided by
appropriate internal division of labor." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, FINAL REPORT, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1941). See Villani

v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 1185, 1190 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (NYSE procedures for segregating prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions carry presumption of impartiality), aff'd sub nom. Sloan v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc., 489 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.
1973).
42 See RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLICABLE TO EXCHANGE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 6, 2
AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 3406 (1975).
"' This procedure has evolved through practice; it is not required by Amex rules.

19791

REPLY TO LOWENFELS

and Lowenfels cites none. Moreover, as noted earlier, it is in the
nature of the disciplinary process-whether judicial, administrative, or self-regulatory- that the prosecutor has the initiative.
Fourth, Lowenfels argues that confusion results from charges preferred against specialist units or firms as entities, rather than solely against individual members. However, charging a firm with
corporate responsibility for misdeeds is no more objectionable
than the common practice of naming a corporation in a criminal
44
indictment.
The respondent is further hindered in preparing his case, asserts Lowenfels, by the money and time needed to retain expert
witnesses and analyze their findings. If a respondent feels that an
expert witness is necessary for his defense, he must incur the expense, just as he would in a judicial or administrative proceeding.
And as to time, an average of two months elapses between the
date charges are served and the date scheduled for the Amex
hearing. Furthermore, a respondent in need of more time can
appeal to the panel chairman for an extension. 45 In practice, few
such appeals are taken because the Amex panel assistant liberally
grants requested extensions.
Other examples of unfairness allegedly occur at the hearing
stage. Lowenfels contends that prehearing press coverage of the
facts of the case, combined with the panel members' respect for
an experienced prosecutor, may result in a de facto presumption
of guilt. The possibility that press coverage of a matter has been
seen by the triers of fact is equally likely in a jury trial. Similarly,
factfinders are no more likely to rely upon the prosecutor in SRO
hearings than in criminal trials or in proceedings before government agencies. In practice, the prosecution is more likely than the
respondent to be hurt since SRO prosecutors tend to be young
attorneys whereas respondents may retain experienced counsel.
C. Focusing on Rules or Their Absence While Ignoring Actual Practice
Lowenfels purports to speak from personal experience as respondents' counsel before the SROs. Nevertheless, it is an indica-

"" See I WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 52 (1957). This principle is recognized in AM. STOCK Ex. CONsT. art. V, § 4(r), 2 AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 2162
(1978).
4 See RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLICABLE TO EXCHANGE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 4, 2
Am. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 3404-05 (1975) (chairman has discretion to determine time
and place of all panel meetings).

412
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tion of the bias of his Article that where the SROs provide protections not required by their rules, he ignores the practice and
points to the supposed inadequacy of the rules.
Lowenfels notes that the SROs do not have statutes of limitations for the bringing of disciplinary proceedings. However, few,
if any, Amex disciplinary proceedings are brought more than two
years after the conduct complained of occurred, and the vast
majority are brought within a few months. Imposing a statute of
limitations would thus have little practical impact. Nor need respondents fear that a delay will result in records being lost; SEC
rule 17a-1 46 requires the SROs to retain records for five years.
Lowenfels states that the SROs do not in their rules provide
for formal discovery rights. 47 However, applications for prehearing discovery are granted on a liberal basis where the relevancy of
documents requested can be shown. Where an application is denied, the respondent may appeal the staff decision to the panel
chairman. Furthermore, for an SRO to allow discovery equivalent
to that allowed in federal court would deprive SRO proceedings
of much of their special advantages of speed and relative simplicity.
In addition, Lowenfels complains that the SRO prosecutor is
not obliged to furnish the respondent with a list of witnesses or
the documentary evidence to be introduced at the hearing, and
that issues cannot be narrowed because facts are not stipulated. In
practice, lists of witnesses and all documentary evidence are furnished to the respondent upon his request. Furthermore, the parties may and do enter into stipulations of facts.48
Perhaps SRO rules should be amended to reflect SRO practices, but fairness demands that critics acknowledge both.
D. Lowenfels' Suggested Solutions
Lowenfels concludes his Article with a number of suggestions for changes in the disciplinary procedures of the SROs. Some
of these are inappropriate, for reasons given elsewhere in this re-

46

17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-1 (1978).

47 In the Second Circuit, there is no constitutional right to discovery in New York Stock

Exchange disciplinary proceedings.
368 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
48 See NYSE CONST.art. XIV, §
CONsT. art. V, § 2, 2 AM. STOCK
currently have a formal stipulation

See, e.g., Crimmins v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
aff'd, 503 F.2d 560 (2d Cir. 1974).
14, 2 NYSE GUIDE (CCH) 1099 (1978); AM. STOCK Ex.
EX. GUIDE (CCH) 2157 (1978). The NASD does not
procedure.
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sponse, others are already part of the practice of the SROs, and
still others are based on false premises. Two suggestions, however,
merit additional comment.
Lowenfels suggests that disciplinary decisions should be accompanied by "carefully reasoned opinions" and that these opinions should be catalogued by subject matter and made available to
respondents. As indicated above, the Exchange Act requires that
any disciplinary action by an SRO be accompanied by a statement
specifying, among other things, the acts or omissions complained
49
of and the statutory provisions or rules that have been violated.
To require an opinion that does more than this would be burdensome and would further blur the beneficial distinctions between
SRO proceedings and those of a court or administrative agency.
As to indexing SRO opinions by subject matter, there is no question but that this should be done. It should be noted, however,
that under Amex rules all disciplinary actions, other than minor
actions of a "housekeeping" or administrative nature, are made
public. 50 Where requested by a respondent or his counsel, the
Amex supplies copies of public releases concerning any disciplinary cases relevant to the case at hand.
Finally, Lowenfels recommends that the SEC staff be prohibited from intervening, formally or informally, in any case pending
before an SRO. It is unclear how the SEC is to be "prohibited"
from such involvement, particularly where the SEC has concurrent jurisdiction over the matter, i.e., where a possible violation of
the federal securities laws is involved. Nevertheless, I agree with
the basic spirit of Lowenfels' suggestion. Although the SEC has
generally exercised restraint, it has occasionally brought proceedings even though an SRO has fully investigated a matter, initiated
proceedings, and taken disciplinary action. Such duplicative action
by the SEC is not only wasteful of regulatory resources and unnecessarily burdensome to respondents, but it also undermines
the independent functioning of the self-regulatory system. In the
rare case where it is clear, after the SRO has completed its action,
that it has substantially failed to fulfill its obligations, the Commission might properly bring its own proceeding. But this should
occur only in the most egregious cases if the self-regulatory system is to retain its vigor.
49 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 6(d)(1), 15A(h)(1), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(d)(1), 78o3(h)(1) (1976).
50 RULES OF PROCEDURE APPLICABLE TO EXCHANGE DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS 13, 2
Am. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 3407 (1975).
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CONCLUSION

Over the years, the disciplinary procedures of the SROs have
changed to incorporate a number of procedural protections. Since
1975, basic elements of fairness have also been required by the
Exchange Act. 5 1 Contrary to Lowenfels' unfounded assertions,
SRO procedures are fair. Where challenged, they have been upheld by the courts. In evaluating these procedures it must be recognized that securities regulation involves a balance between protecting the rights of persons accused of misconduct and protecting
investors. The tension that inevitably exists between these competing considerations is heightened in the SROs because they must
regulate the conduct of their own members.
Unfortunately, Lowenfels ignores this basic truth and calls
into question-without any factual basis-the integrity of the persons charged with accomplishing the difficult task of selfregulation. In taking this approach, he does not serve the best
interests of the SROs, their memberships and staffs, or the investing public.
" See note 18 supra.

